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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 137
CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-AGREEMENT INTERFERING WITH
MANAGEMENT BY BoARD OF Dmc'roRs-Plaintiffs, minority stockholders in
a closely held corporation, asked that the court declare invalid an agree-
ment between the majority stockholders and their "agent-directors" for the
management of the business. The agreement provided that for ten years
the stock of the parties to the agreement would be voted as a unit as any
seven of the agents should direct or, if they could not agree, as directed by
an arbitrator chosen by them. The agents were to be elected to the board
of directors by the stockholders who appointed them. Under a cumulative
voting provision, the parties to the agreement had sufficient shares to elect
eight directors. It was further agreed to maintain the number of directors
at fifteen, to remove any director who voted contrary to any plan which
they favored, and to confer on all matters of policy and planning for
future action. If any seven of the agent-directors failed to agree, the matter
was to be submitted to an arbitrator. The plaintiffs attacked the agree-
ment. on the ground that it deprived the directors of their discretion and
made management by the board a mere sham. The defendants argued
that the provisions of the agreement merely tended to preserve control in
the hands of the majority and were absolutely necessary in today's business
world. Held, the agreement is an invalid attempt to encroach upon the
directors' exercise of independent business judgment and might possibly
permit director action to be dictated by an outsider or a minority of the
board, thus violating the Delaware Corporation Law. Abercrombie v.
Davies, (Del. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 893.
The corporate director is not simply the agent of the stockholders who
elect him.' His function is defined by the legislature of the state of in-
corporation.2 He is required to exercise his best judgment for the benefit
of all the stockholders.3 It would follow logically that any agreement
1 Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918); Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor,
19 N.Y. 207 (1859).
2New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 844 (1939).
3 Billings v. Shaw, 209 N.Y. 265, 103 N.E. 142 (1913).
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which limits the business discretion of the director would be void as con-
trary to the legislative mandates which direct that "the business of every
corporation shall be managed by a board of directors." 4  It is impossible
to dispute the fact that a legislature has the power to define the function
of the corporate director, but the language used in most statutes is of little
help in deciding cases.5 The majority of courts read their statutes as
prohibiting agreements which curb the discretion of the board of directors
or re-delegate the power of management, 6 though there have been many
exceptions to the strict construction.7 Under the terms of the agreement
in the principal case, the agents were bound to cast their votes as directors
in a unit. Thus, the power of management was taken from the entire
board and could be exercised either by a minority (seven of the eight
directors who were parties to the agreement) or by an outsider (an arbi-
trator appointed by them). The avowed purpose of this agreement was
clear, viz., to initiate and maintain policies which the parties determined
were to their joint benefit. The chancellor was equally clear that it was
invalid because it violated the mandate of the statute. The agreement
was designed to achieve a. degree of control generally associated with a
partnership, not a corporation. Legal writers have argued that the board
of directors manages the business of a corporation not because of any
legislative or public policy, but because of the "business necessity" for
centralized control.8 From this premise they conclude that in the case of
4 Forty states have provisions in their corporation statutes which require management
by a board of directors. Ark. Stat. (1947) §64-401; Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering, 1953)
§800; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §5165; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §141; Fla. Stat. (1955)
§608.09; Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1955) §22-1864; Idaho Code (1948) §30-139; Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1955) c. 32, §157.33; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1942) §25-208; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick,
1949) §17-3101; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §271.345; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 12, §34; Md. Code
Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 23, §48; Mass. Laws Ann. (1948) c. 156, §21; Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) §450.13; Minn. Stat. (1953) §301.28; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §351.310; Mont.
Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §15-401; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1954) §21-111; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer,
1929) §1630; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §294:89; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) tit. 14, §7-1;
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §51-2-14; 22 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943) §27; N.C. Gen.
Stat. (1950) §55-48; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §10-0507; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953)
§1701.63; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 18, §1.34; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §57.180; Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, Supp. 1955) tit. 15, §43; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 116, §20; S.D. Code (1939)
§11.0705; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §3742; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1945) art.
1327; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §16-2-21; Vt. Stat. (1947) §5779; Va. Code (1950) §13-201;
Wash. Rev. Code §23.36.010; W.Va. Code (1955) §3028; Wis. Stat. (1955) §180.30.
5 Hornstein, "Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership," 18 LAw AND
CONTENT. PRoB. 435 (1953).
6 Manson v. Curtis, note 1 supra; Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor, note 1 supra; Jackson
v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910); Templeman v. Grant, 75 Colo. 519, 227 P.
555 (1924); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); West v. Camden,
135 U.S. 507, 10 S.Ct. 838 (1889); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.
(2d) 829 (1945); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres, 297 N.Y. 174, 77
N.E. (2d) 633 (1948).
7 In Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936), an agreement between directors
who were also the sole stockholders to vote in the future for certain officers was specifically
enforced.
8 23 N.Y.L.Q. Rr-v. 150 (1948); Delaney, "The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be
Tied in Advance?" 50 COL L. RFv. 52 (1950); Hornstein, "Stockholders' Agreements in the
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the closely held corporation where there is no such necessity courts should
uphold agreements by a majority of the stockholders which dilute the
directors' power to manage if the non-participating minority is not thereby
damaged or defrauded.9 This approach is supposedly realistic and avoids
strict adherence to "statutory norms" or technical rules.10 It also avoids
the statute.i It is difficult to understand why the typical statutory
language, "the business of every corporation shall be managed by a board
of directors," should be read, "the business of every corporation shall be
managed by a board of directors unless the stockholders provide other-
wise." It is not contended that the typical language is so clear that it
needs no interpretation or that it should permit of no exceptions, but to
validate the usurpation of director power in the principal case it would
be necessary to assume that legislators neither mean what they say nor say
what they mean. If there is a need for special laws for closely held corpora-
tions which would confer upon them the advantages of incorporation yet
permit them to be managed like partnerships, this is an area for legislation
of the non-judicial variety. The chancellor is surely right in paying heed
to the statutory scheme when dealing with a creature created by that statute.
There should be some stronger reason than "business necessity" for ignor-
ing a statutory provision.
Edward H. Hoenicke, S.Ed.
Closely Held Corporation," 59 YALE LJ. 1040 (1950); STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 2d
ed., §143 (1949).
9 This idea apparently originated in the dictum of Manson v. Curtis, note 1 supra,
but it was there coupled with the requirement that the agreement not substantially deviate
from the corporate norm.
10 Delaney, "The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance?" 50 COL.
L. REV. 52 at 65 (1950).
11 It is idle to say that agreements which fetter a director's discretion do not violate
any "public policy." If public policy is anything more than a figment of the imagination,
what better place to look for it than in the statutes themselves? The difficult problems of
statutory interpretation are not solved by vague references to vague "policies."
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